There has long been an investigation, especially amongst modern political theorists, into the degree to which medieval theology and philosophy have or have not some bearing on modern conceptions of natural rights.
1 Late medieval scholasticism has been thought to reveal objective and subjective natural right(s) and the modern western world is certainly fi lled with claims to a plurality of subjective rights. Th ere were, in fact, diff erent medieval traditions of rights discourse-that of civil lawyers, that of theologians to name only two. Here I want to discuss the perspectives of Franciscans, especially Franciscan theologians of the fourteenth century, and what they mean when they used the word ius.
Some today think that the older natural law references to ius/iura and the post-Enlightenment reference to natural or human rights say much the same things. I happen not to think this always to be the case although certain contemporary references to human rights oft en rely on, unacknowledged, an earlier Christian foundation. My aim here is to focus not on what today we seem more comfortable with: the individual's just claims to entitlements or even that subjective desires be acknowledged. Rather, I want to bring to your attention a language that was especially vibrant amongst Franciscans concerning what is owed to members of our species and how we arrive at this knowledge. My perspective, because I think it is theirs, attempts a highlighting of duties: to God, oneself and to others, simultaneously downgrading rights without altogether abolishing them, especially in the domain of civil law.
It is acknowledged that medieval rights language developed concurrently with wider notions of liberty. Some spoke of liberties as exemptions from law while others spoke of liberty as a possession, a power of the soul capable of exercise without appeal to some higher, external human authority in the making of choices and performance of acts.
2
Here, the exercise of one's liberty was a ius, a power, taken as an inherent species-specifi c quality, relying on a normative conception of human nature with its moral power to pursue the good and avoid evil. Th is was a ius, a capacity that characterized the functional operations of the soul in reasoning and willing to act in one way or another. Generally, ius is what iustum est, what is just; ius could also refer to civil, positive and legal capacity. Can we discern a distinctive Franciscan voice in the employment of these terms? I think we can and it contrasts especially with that of their Dominican contemporaries.
Th e Franciscan voice emerges out of their evolving perspectives, fi rst: on the pre-lapsarian conditions of Adam and Eve; then: on what occurred aft er the Fall but before cities were established; and thirdly, on what politics now is for us in cities. Of course, in Gratian's vast canon law compendium, the Decretum, we are already told of the natural community of goods by ius naturae, distinct from custom and constitutions.
3 But for Franciscans, and peculiar to their vow of poverty, the burning question was whether there now is a possibility to renounce property in "cities" and still not destroy the signifi cance of politics in the here and now.
We shall have to become familiar with their distinctive and evolving understandings of diff erent kinds of dominia, that is, dominium in the state of innocence and dominium aft er the Fall. Th e focus on this word especially as the fourteenth century progressed with increasing turmoil for the Order is a complex one. In the state of innocence, some Franciscans observed that the ius naturae was a principle of indistinct
